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NOTE
THE NEW YORK MARRIAGE EQUALITY ACT
AND THE STRENGTH OF ITS RELIGIOUS
EXCEPTIONS
ANDREW R. HAMILTONt
INTRODUCTION

Religious organizations have long worked in New York to
provide social services for people of the state.' Following the
Civil War, as a result of increasing immigration from mostly
Catholic countries, Catholic religious societies and lay volunteers
began developing local institutions to support the new, poor,
uneducated masses.'
These organizations provided schools,
foundling homes, orphanages, shelters for women, services for
youth, and family casework.3 Over time these organizations,
"anchored in child-care," would house thousands of infants and
children whose parents were either deceased or whose parents
believed the organizations could provide their children a better
life than they themselves could.4
From this beginning, over a century and a half ago, Catholic
social welfare organizations have continued to grow. The
national umbrella group of these organizations, Catholic
Charities USA, was recently ranked as the third largest charity
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Dartmouth College. I would like to thank Professors Mark L. Movsesian and Marc
0. DeGirolami for their guidance and encouragement. I would also like to thank my
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I At first, the majority of these organizations were Protestant Christian by
nature, mirroring the population of New York as a whole. See DOROTHY M. BROWN
& ELIZABETH MCKEOWN, THE POOR BELONG TO US: CATHOLIC CHARITIES AND
AMERICAN WELFARE 2 (1997).
2 Id. at 3.
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in the United States.' One area of social need in which Catholic
Charities is especially important today is foster care placement.
The foster care system in the United States deals with one of the
most vulnerable populations in the country. Children are in the
foster care system because their families cannot care for them.
The cause of this may be the death of the child's parents or a
court determination of abuse and neglect.6 The number of
children in the foster care system is staggering. In New York
City, there are currently 16,000 children in foster care.' In any
given year, Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of New York
places 6,545 of these children with families.8
This history of service has been challenged recently by the
advent of same-sex marriage. The reason: anti-discrimination
laws.
All same-sex marriage statutes contain provisions
prohibiting discrimination between same-sex and traditional
marriages.' However, such prohibitions conflict with Catholic
doctrine. The Catholic Church considers marriage to be an
institution exclusively between a man and a woman. 0 It also
considers "homosexual acts [to be] acts of grave depravity, [and
Catholic] tradition has always declared that 'homosexual acts are
intrinsically disordered.' ""' In 2003, the Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith issued a statement reiterating the Church's
stance on homosexuality and same-sex marriage.12
This
document also raised the fear that same-sex marriage legislation
would lead to same-sex couples adopting children." To avoid a
conflict between state law and religious beliefs, all statutes

5 The
200 Largest
U.S.
Charities, FORBES
(Nov.
8,
2012),
http://www.forbes.com/top-charities/.
6 Protectingand Nurturing Children and Youth, CATHOLIC CHARITIES
OF THE
ARCHDIOCESE
OF
NEW YORK,
http://www.catholiccharitiesny.org/what-wedo/protecting-and-nurturing-children-and-youth/protecting-information/ (last visited
Aug. 15, 2013).
7 Become a Foster or Adoptive Parent, N.Y.C. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN'S SERVS.,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/html/become parent/become-parent.shtml (last visited
Aug. 15, 2013).
8 Protectingand Nurturing Children and Youth, supra note 6.
* See infra note 106.
10 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH [ 2335, 2360 (2d ed. 1997).

I 2357 (footnote omitted).
CARDINAL JOSEPH RATZINGER, PASTORAL LETTER CONSIDERATIONS
REGARDING PROPOSALS To GIVE LEGAL RECOGNITION TO UNIONS BETWEEN
HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, June 3, 2003).
11 Id.
12

13
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creating same-sex marriages have offered varying degrees of
religious exceptions from the general anti-discrimination
provisions. 14
The actual protection these exceptions have provided to
religious organizations varies from location to location. In some
jurisdictions, Catholic Charities has ceased offering foster care
placement services altogether rather than test the exceptions
through costly litigation. Such is the case in Massachusetts,
Washington, D.C., and the Rockford Diocese of Illinois.'" In other
jurisdictions, including other Illinois dioceses, Catholic Charities
has tested the exception in court and lost. 16 Still, in other
jurisdictions like New Hampshire, Vermont, and Connecticut,
religious exceptions have allowed Catholic Charities to continue
following Catholic doctrine by refusing to place children with
same-sex couples."
Whether or not New York's same-sex marriage law will
provide Catholic Charities with a sufficient religious exception
remains to be seen. The New York Marriage Equality Act
("MEA") was passed on June 24, 2011.18 Codified at Domestic
Relations Law ("DRL") sections 10-a and 10-b, this law grants
same-sex couples the right to marry, and includes an antidiscrimination provision prohibiting discrimination based on the
The New York legislature created an
spouses' genders."9
exception to this anti-discrimination provision which purports to
prevent religious organizations from being required to solemnize

14

See infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.

" Michelle Boorstein, Citing Same-Sex Marriage Bill, Washington Archdiocese
Ends Foster-Care Program, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2010, at B01, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/16/AR2010021604
899.html; Manya A. Brachear, Agency To Take Over Foster Care for Catholic
Charities in Rockford, CHI. TRIB., June 16, 2011, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/
2011-06-16/news/ct-met-foster-care-rockford-20110616-8_1_catholic-charities-careand-adoption-catholic-agency; News Release, Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of
Boston, Statement on Adoption Programs (Mar. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.bostoncatholic.org/uploadedFiles/News-releases_2006_statement0603102.pdf.
16 See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
" See infra note 106.

s Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex
Marriage, Becoming Largest State To Pass Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/nyregion/gay-marriage-approved-by-new-yorksenate.html.
19 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney 2012).
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or recognize same-sex marriages.2 0 In addition, the exception
also adopted language from the New York Human Rights Law
("HRL"), exempting religious organizations from antidiscrimination requirements when the organization acts to
promote its religious principles. One year after its passage, it
remains to be seen whether this exception will allow Catholic
Charities to follow its religious dictates by refusing to place foster
children with same-sex couples.
This Note will argue that the religious exception of the MEA,
codified at DRL section 10-b(2), indeed covers the decision by
religious organizations, such as Catholic Charities, not to place
foster children with same-sex couples. 2 ' Part II will analyze New
York court decisions interpreting identical religious exception
language under the State's HRL. Part III will examine the
language of the MEA as well as other jurisdictions' same-sex
marriage laws. This textual analysis, along with a look at the
MEA's legislative history, suggests that the New York legislature
intended the exception to provide broad protections to religious
organizations. With this textual analysis, legislative history, and
judicial precedent in mind, Part IV will discuss how Catholic
Charities' decision not to place foster children with same-sex
couples falls neatly within the exception's protection. Finally,
Part V will conclude this Note by identifying other challenges to
Catholic Charities in carrying out its foster care placement
services.
I.

THE NEW YORK HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATIONS OF ITS RELIGIOUS EXCEPTION

The New York Human Rights Law, codified at Executive
Law ("EL") section 290, et seq., is the basis of the State's antidiscrimination policy. The law identifies certain actors who are
liable under the law2 for "unlawful discriminatory practice [s] "23
and identifies the consequences for violating the law.24 An
exception was created for otherwise discriminatory action taken
Id. § 10-b.
Whether such discrimination violates constitutional rights-for example, the
Establishment Clause, the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clausefederal statute or other state laws, while obviously important, are beyond the scope
of this Note.
22 N.Y. ExEc. LAw §§ 296(1)-(10) (McKinney 2012).
20
21

23

Id.

24

Id.

§ 299.
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action.. . is
"such
when
organizations
by
religious
calculated ... to promote the religious principles for which [the
organization] is established or maintained." 25 This language is
similar to religious exceptions in other states and territories,2 6 as
well as under federal employment non-discrimination law. 27 New
York courts have interpreted the exception on several occasions
and, in doing so, have balanced public policy favoring antidiscrimination with the religious freedom of religious
organizations. The resulting case law has upheld religious
organizations' ability to discriminate against non-members and
homosexuals in employment and the rental of property, but has
denied religious organizations the ability to participate in
"odious [1" discrimination.2 8
The Language of the New York Human Rights Law and Its
Religious Exception

A.

In enacting the HRL, the legislature adopted a clear
The legislature viewed
statement against discrimination.
discrimination as threatening not only "the rights and proper
privileges" of New Yorkers but also menacing "the institutions
and foundation of a free democratic state," and harming "the
peace, order, health, safety and general welfare of the state and
The statute recognizes that access to
its inhabitants."2 9
employment, education, public accommodations, housing, and
commercial space without discrimination is a civil right.30 To

25
26

Id. § 296(11).
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.090(2) (West 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.

151B, § 1(5) (West 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:18 (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:5-5(1) (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495(e) (West 2012); 22 GUAM CODE
ANN. § 5211 (2012); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 460 2012.
27 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2006) ("This subchapter shall not apply ... to
a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to
the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected
with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or
society of its activities.").
28 See Logan v. Salvation Army, 10 Misc. 3d 756, 758-59, 809 N.Y.S.2d 846,
848-49 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2005).
29 ExEc. § 290(3).
30 Id.
§§ 291(1)-(2).
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protect this right, the statute prohibits specific "unlawful
discriminatory practice [s],"31 based on specific characteristics,
including "creed" and "sexual orientation."32
Despite this clear policy against discrimination, the
legislature excluded from the definition of discrimination certain
actions by religious organizations when those actions are
intended to effectuate their religious principles. 3 The exception,
in part, reads:
Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to bar
[1] any
religious .. . organization .. . [2] from
limiting
employment or sales or rental of housing accommodations or
admission to or giving preference to persons of the same
religion .. . or [3] from taking such action as is calculated by
such organization to promote the religious principles for which
it is established or maintained.34
To better analyze what is covered under this exception, this
Note divides the exception into three parts. The first part
identifies the qualifying religious actors. The second part
enumerates specific actions falling within the exception. The
third part identifies a broad catch-all which includes other,
unenumerated actions.35 Read alone, the breadth of this catch-all
is potentially unlimited. As such, a primary concern of courts
has been determining what actions actually fall within its
province.
B.

New York Court Interpretationsof the Human Rights Law's
Religious Exception

Although New York courts have, in general, narrowly
interpreted the exception under EL section 296(11), when it
comes to discrimination based on sexual orientation, the courts
have opened the door for a broader interpretation. In broad
strokes, the case law holds that religious organizations: may not
discriminate on the basis of protected characteristics other than

Id. §§ 296(1)-(10).
E.g., id. §§ 296(1)-(2).
* See Scheiber v. St. John's University, 84 N.Y.2d 120, 126, 638 N.E.2d 977,
980, 615 N.Y.S.2d 332, 335 (1994) (interpreting the religious exception under N.Y.
ExEc. LAw § 296(11)).
34 ExEc. § 296(11).
35 See Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Jewish Cmty. Relations Council of N.Y., Inc., 968
F.2d 286, 294 (2d Cir. 1992).
31

32
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religion"; may not influence other-non-religious--organizations
to discriminate on the basis of religion"; may only discriminate
on the basis of religion when such action is calculated to
effectuate its religious mission 8 ; may, in choosing its employees,
discriminate against people who do not adhere to the lifestyle
presented by the organization, if such action is calculated to
effectuate its religious mission;" may not retaliate against
employees who sue the organization;40 nor "harass" employees or
treat them in an "odiously discriminatory manner."4 ' The
exception only applies to the HRL and does not preclude
subsequent legislatures from imposing affirmative duties on
religious employers to prevent conduct which they may find
offensive.42
In the earliest interpretation of the HRL, the Appellate
Division gave a religious organization broad discretion to
discriminate against those not sharing its faith. In Cowen v. Lily
Dale Assembly, a Spiritualist organization was sued after it
rented its resort facilities to non-members during the summer
but refused to do so during the rest of the year."
The
organization argued that renting the property during the
summer was part of its mission to make non-members
conversant with the organization's beliefs. 45 The court accepted
the organization's argument and affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint.
In reaching its decision, the court adopted a
deferential tone: "It is not for this court nor any other secular
" See Priolo v. St. Mary's Home for Working Girls, Inc., 157 Misc. 2d 494, 498,

597 N.Y.S.2d 890, 892 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1993).
See Jews for Jesus, 968 F.2d at 295.
See Scheiber, 84 N.Y.2d at 127, 638 N.E.2d at 980, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
39 See Lown v. Salvation Army, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 223, 252-53 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
40See id. at 254-55.
4' Logan v. Salvation Army, 10 Misc. 3d 756, 758-59, 809 N.Y.S.2d 846, 848-49
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2005).
42 See Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 28 A.D.3d 115, 137,
808 N.Y.S.2d 447, 466 (3d Dep't 2006) (holding that N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(11)
(McKinney 2012) does not preclude the New York legislature from requiring a
Catholic charitable organization to provide insurance coverage for artificial
contraception to its employees, even though the use of such devices is "a grave sin"
within the Church).
43 44 A.D.2d 772, 354 N.Y.S.2d 269 (4th Dep't 1974).
" See id. at 772, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 270-71.
* Id. at 772-73, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 271-72.
4
Id. at 773, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 271-72.
17

38
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institution to regulate the manner in which respondent exercises
its ecclesiastical judgment."4 7 This ecclesiastical judgment is part
of an organization's "fundamental rights under the Free Exercise
clause," and these rights can only be diminished if they are
harmful to society. *
Twenty years later, the New York Court of Appeals rejected
this deferential position and instead required a religious
organization to prove that its actions were undertaken to
effectuate its religious mission. In Scheiber v. St. John's
University,49 the court refused to dismiss a wrongful termination
suit brought by a Jewish vice president against a Catholic
university because an "undisputed factual predicate [was]
lacking" as to whether the university actually fired the vice
president for religious reasons.
In defending its action, the
university invoked the exception under section 296(11) and
raised a "rhetorical question" whether, considering the "strong
religious position taken by the Catholic church" on a variety of
hot-button social issues, "it [would] be unlawful for a Catholic
University to prefer that its Vice President of Student Life have
the same religious convictions as that of the Catholic [Clhurch?"sI
Unlike the Appellate Division, which refused to investigate the
"ecclesiastical judgment" of the Spiritualist organization, the
Court of Appeals demanded that the university prove it had
dismissed the Jewish vice president in order to hire a Catholic
one.52 Although the court admitted the "potential for excessive
entanglement in religious affairs,"' it appeared primarily
concerned with avoiding "wholesale discrimination": "A religious
employer may not discriminate against an individual for reasons
having nothing to do with the free exercise of religion and then
invoke the exemption as a shield against its unlawful conduct."5 4
4
Id. at 773, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 271 (citing Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) and
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929)).
a Id. at 773, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
49 84 N.Y.2d 120, 638 N.E.2d 977, 615 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1994).
50 Id. at 127-28, 638 N.E.2d at 980, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
51 Id. at 124-25, 638 N.E.2d at 979, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 334.
52 Id. at 125, 127, 638 N.E.2d at 979-80, 615 N.Y.S.2d at
334-35.
1 Id. at 127-28, 638 N.E.2d at 980, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
*' Id. at 127, 638 N.E.2d at 980, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 335. The Court of Appeals'
requirement in Scheiber that the religious organization show that its actions were
actually related to promoting its religious mission was foreshadowed by the New
York Supreme Court in Priolo v. St. Mary's Home for Working Girls, Inc., 157 Misc.
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In both Cowen and Scheiber, the courts dealt with religious
organizations that discriminated against those belonging to
different religions. It would seem, however, that a categorically
different situation arises when a religious organization
discriminates on the basis of someone's sexual orientation. A
non-Spiritualist, by definition, is not a Spiritualist; likewise a
Jew is not a Catholic. There is nothing that excludes a person
with same-sex attraction, by definition, from a particular
religion; rather, it is often homosexual acts that are inconsistent
with a particular religion." This is the position that is laid out in
the sacred tradition of the Catholic Church.56 On the one hand,
the Church strongly condemns homosexual acts." On the other
hand, "men and women who have deep-seated homosexual
tendencies .... must be accepted with respect, compassion, and
sensitivity."" "[Ilf they are Christians," they are called to unite
the difficulties of their same-sex attraction "to the sacrifice of the
Lord's Cross."59
Through chastity, people with same-sex
2d 494, 597 N.Y.S.2d 890 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1993). In Priolo, the religious
organization, the Congregation of the Daughters of Divine Charity, operated a
residence for single women as part of its chief ministry "to provide temporary homes
under proper moral influence for young women of limited means who come into
cities seeking to establish themselves and begin an independent life." Id. at 495, 497,
597 N.Y.S.2d at 891-92. The Congregation was sued under N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2)
(McKinney 2012) when it attempted to exercise its rule prohibiting boarders over the
age of forty-five. Id. at 495-96, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 891. Although the Congregation
moved for summary judgment under the exception of § 296(11), the court denied the
motion. Id. at 497, 500, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 892-94. The court found that "[a] catch-all
phrase allowing 'such action as is calculated ... to promote' cannot be used to
broaden the specific exemption granted by EL § 296(11) to allow discrimination
against another protected group. The discrimination on the basis of age alleged here
offends the principle of equal opportunity and defendants' mission can be achieved
without resort to such discrimination." Id. at 498, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 892 (alteration in
original).
5 See, e.g., Southern Baptist Convention, Position Statement: Sexuality,

SBC.NET, http://www.sbc.net/aboutus/pssexuality.asp (last visited Aug. 15, 2013)
("Homosexuality is not a 'valid alternative lifestyle.' The Bible condemns it as sin. It
is not, however, unforgivable sin. The same redemption available to all sinners is
available to homosexuals. They, too, may become new creations in Christ.").
2357-59; see
" See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 10,
also U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, MINISTRY TO PERSONS WITH A
HOMOSEXUAL INCLINATION: GUIDELINES FOR PASTORAL CARE 5 (Nov. 14, 2006)
[hereinafter
GUIDELINES
FOR
PASTORAL
CARE],
available
at

http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/homosexuality/
upload/minstry-persons-homosexual-inclination-2006.pdf.
5 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 10, 1 2357.
" Id. 1 2358 (emphasis added).
69 Id.
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attraction can "approach Christian perfection.""o Therefore, it
appears-at least within the Catholic Church-that a person
with same-sex attraction may still be a member of the religion.6
In such a case, a religious organization firing its employee on the
basis of his sexuality-rather than the fact that he was not a
Spiritualist or not a Catholic-would not be covered under the
exception because the person is "of the same religion."6 2
New York courts have not been troubled by this distinction,
and so in the two cases in which homosexuals have alleged
employment discrimination by religious organizations, the courts
have assummed that such discrimination may fall within the
exception."
In both cases, the defendant was the Salvation
Army, a Christian movement that provides social services,
including foster care placement, as part of its religious mission.'
The plaintiffs brought claims on the basis of religious and sexual
orientation discrimination. 6 Taken together, the pair of cases
suggest that religious organizations can fire or refuse to hire
people on the basis of sexual orientation and still fall within the
protection of EL section 296(11).6 However, the exception does
Id. at 5 2359.
However, once this attraction is acted upon, and the person engages in
homosexual acts, the person may be in a state of mortal sin and therefore prohibited
from receiving holy communion. See GUIDELINES FOR PASTORAL CARE, supra note
56, at 5-6.
62 N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296(11) (McKinney 2012).
6 See Lown v. Salvation Army, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 223, 252-53 (S.D.N.Y.
2005); Logan v. Salvation Army, 10 Misc. 3d 756, 758-59, 809 N.Y.S.2d 846, 848-49
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2005).
6 Lown, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 228-29; see also Logan, 10 Misc. 3d at 758, 809
N.Y.S.2d at 848. The Salvation Army describes itself as "an international movement,
[which] is an evangelical part of the universal Christian church." Lown, 393 F. Supp.
2d at 230 (quoting from the Salvation Army's Reorganization Plan which gave rise to
the litigation). It "is 'not a Social Service Agency [but] a Christian Movement with a
Social Service program.' " Id. at 229 (alteration in original).
65 The addition of "sexual orientation," as a protected characteristic under EXEC.
§ 296, was approved by the New York Legislature on December 17, 2002, as part of
the Sexual Orientation Non-Discrimination Act ("SONDA"), and became effective on
January 16, 2003. 2002 N.Y. Sess. Laws A. 1971 § 296 (McKinney 2003). The
discriminatory events in Lown began in March 2003, after this law became effective.
See Lown, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 230. However, the discriminatory events described in
Logan occurred before the law was approved, between October 2001 and January
2002. See Logan, 10 Misc. 3d at 757, 809 N.Y.S.2d at 848. The court acknowledged
as such and rejected the plaintiffs argument that SONDA should be read to apply
retroactively. Id. at 760, 809 N.Y.S.2d at 849-50.
1 See Lown, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 252-53; Logan, 10 Misc. 3d at 758-59, 809
N.Y.S.2d at 848-49.
6o

61
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not allow religious organizations to retaliate against employees
who assert discrimination claims against them" or to "harass
their employees and treat [them] in an odiously discriminatory
manner."" In deciding these cases, the courts did not seem
concerned that the Salvation Army was discriminating, at least
in part, on sexual orientation while EL section 296(11) only
explicitly allows discrimination on the basis of religion. Rather,
the courts seemed satisfied that in limiting employment to
homosexuals, the Salvation Army's actions fell into
the
catch-all
language
of
EL
section 296(11)"taking ... action ... calculated ... to promote the religious
principles for which it is established or maintained." 9
In the first case, Logan v. Salvation Army, the plaintiff

alleged that the Salvation Army discriminated against him
because he was Jewish and a homosexual." His supervisor was
hostile towards him at work, undermined his job performance,
and treated him differently from heterosexual employees. 7 On
one occasion the supervisor stated: "I wonder how the officers
would feel if they knew they had a Jewish fag working for
them."72 Upon bringing his grievances to his human resources
representative, he was reprimanded, and shortly thereafter,
terminated." The New York Supreme Court, while refusing to
grant the Salvation Army's motion to dismiss under the facts of
this particular case, did not foreclose the application of EL
section 296(11) in other discrimination cases brought by
homosexuals. In its decision, the court noted that the Salvation
Army is a religious organization under EL section 296(11), and it
does have the right to "promote the religious principles of the
organization"; in this case, however, the organization's actions

' Lown, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 254-55. "Retaliation" is an action prohibited under
the HRL and is defined as an employer "discharging or otherwise taking action
against an individual because the employee 'opposed any practice forbidden under
[the Human Rights Law] or because the [employee] has filed a complaint, testified or
assisted in any proceeding under this article.'" Sharon P. Stiller, 13A New York
Practice: Employment Law § 4:315 (2011) (quoting N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(e)
(McKinney 2012)).
6
Logan, 10 Misc. 3d at 758, 809 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
69 ExEc. § 296(11).
70 Logan, 10 Misc.3d at 757, 809 N.Y.S.2d
at 848.
n Id.
72 Id.
7
Id. at 758, 809 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
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were "a far cry" from the law's "limited exemptions."" Instead,
these actions, described by the court as "harass[ment]," "odiously
discriminatory," and "derogatory," were not covered by the
exception.
While this case is important in understanding how a court
may apply EL section 296(11) in the context of sexual
orientation, it is ultimately inconclusive since the complained of
actions occurred before "sexual orientation" was added as a
protected characteristic to the HRL." In the same year that
Logan was decided, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York decided a case in which the
complained of action occurred after "sexual orientation" was
added. In Lown v. Salvation Army, Inc., former employees
alleged that they were fired or "constructive ly] terminat[ed]"77
for refusing to follow a Reorganization Plan, the stated goal of
which was to "ensure [ that 'a reasonable number of Salvationists
along with other Christians [will be employed].' ""
In
implementing this plan, upper management asked human
resources staff to name homosexuals who were working in the
organization." The upper management also included a new
section in the Employee Manual entitled "The Rules of Conduct,"
which stated "that although '[t]he Salvation Army does not make
employment decisions on the basis of an individual's sexual
orientation or preference[,]' it nonetheless 'reserve[s] the right to
make employment decisions on the basis of an employee's
conduct or behavior that is incompatible with the principles of
the Salvation Army.' "80 Finally, the Salvation Army generally
increased the "manifestations of Christian faith"8 1 in the
workplace as well as required employees to disclose their present
church and minister.8 2
The court found that the discrimination undertaken by the
Salvation Army fell within the exception's catch-all. The court
accepted that the Salvation Army was a religious organization
74
7
76

"
7
7

Id. at 758, 809 N.Y.S.2d at 848-49.
Id. at 758-59, 809 N.Y.S.2d at 848-49.
See supra note 65.
Lown v. Salvation Army, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 223, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

Id. at 229.
Id. at 230.

s0 Id. at 231.
"1Id. at 233.
82 Id. at 231.
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It then dismissed the
under the statutory language. 3
discrimination and hostile environment claims under EL
section 296(11) because "the complained of actions [were] plainly
'calculated ... to promote the religious principles for which it
[was] established or maintained,'" and therefore fell under the
exception.' However, the court refused to dismiss the plaintiffs'
retaliation claims because it could not conclusively determine
that the actions were in furtherance of the organization's
religious principles."
Logan and Lown are the only cases in which New York
courts-or any other courts-have interpreted religious
exceptions to anti-discrimination provisions in the context of
Although several other
sexual orientation discrimination.
jurisdictions have adopted identical or similar religious
exceptions to their anti-discrimination laws,8 6 no court in these
jurisdictions has yet decided whether discrimination based on
sexual orientation fits within its religious exception.87 In Logan
and Lown, one can observe the courts' attempt to stay true to the
broad public policy aims of the HRL, namely preventing
However, unlike
prejudice, intolerance and inequality."
Scheiber, the courts were willing to stretch the exception's catchall and find that sexual orientation discrimination may be
"calculated ... to promote the religious principles for which [the
religious organization] is established or maintained."8 9

3 Id. at 252.
Id. at 252-53 (quoting N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(11) (McKinney 2012)).
* Id. at 254-55.
8I See sources cited supra note 26.
87 A tangentially related issue was decided in Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist
Homes for Children, Inc., 579 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 2009). In this case, the plaintiff
brought a discrimination claim against a religious organization after it fired her for
being a lesbian. Id. at 727-28. Since Kentucky's Civil Rights Law did not prohibit
sexual orientation discrimination, she claimed that her former employer had fired
her because of religious discrimination-in essence arguing that she was fired
because she was living openly as a lesbian in contradiction with the organization's
religious belief that homosexuality is sinful. Id. Acknowledging the undisputed fact
that the organization fired the plaintiff on the basis of her sexuality, the Sixth
Circuit nevertheless dismissed the claim because the plaintiff had "not explained
how this constitutes discrimination based on religion."Id. at 728.
88 See EXEC. § 296(1).
89 Id. § 296(11).
8
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II.

THE NEW YORK MARRIAGE EQUALITY ACT AND ITS RELIGIOUS
EXCEPTIONS

The Marriage Equality Act became law on June 24, 2011.90
In addition to granting same-sex couples the right to marry, the
MEA also prohibits discrimination on the basis of the spouses'
genders." Although the Assembly had previously passed samesex marriage bills, both bills failed to pass the Senate.92 The
MEA, for the first time, incorporated the religious exception
language from the HRL.93 Once the bill passed the Assembly,
additional exceptions were added in the Senate, specifically to
gain majority support. 4 The inclusion of these exceptions was
integral to the passage of the bill.95
This part of the Note will explain how, in creating the
religious exceptions to the MEA, the legislature intended the
exceptions to give religious organizations broad protection from
the law's anti-discrimination language. This intention is present
in both the statute's text as well as in its legislative history.
Confessore & Barbaro, supra note 18.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney 2012).
92 Jeremy W. Peters, New York State Senate Votes Down Gay Marriage Bill,
Dec.
2,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/nyregion/
N.Y. TIMES,
03marriage.html (describing how the Senate rejected the bill by a 38 to 24 vote); Bill
Hammond, Wanted: A Few Good Senators: On Gay Marriage,N.Y Lawmakers Can
Rise to History or Cave to Politics, NYDAILYNEWS.COM (Apr. 26, 2011, 4:00 AM),
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-04-26/news/29492095-1-gay-marriage-gayrights-groups-legislators.
9 Transcript of New York State Assembly Session, at 81-82 (June 15, 2011)
[hereinafter 6/15/11 Assembly Transcript], available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/
write/upload/session/2011/20110615.pdf (statement of Assemb. O'Donnell). In
introducing the bill, Assembly Member O'Donnell stated:
The bills that we passed in 2007 and 2009 were amended by this Governor
to include language that was not previously in the bill, but referenced law
that already exists; specifically, it chose to add sections of the Executive
Law, 292, subdivision 9, as well as 296, subdivision 11. Those provisions
are the carveouts in the Human Rights Law that exempt certain entities
and organizations from being required to be compliant with the Human
Rights Law. So, essentially, this is a marriage bill with the identical
language in the Domestic Relations Law that we passed before, with these
additional references to currently existing law and on the books in the
Executive Law.
Id.
9 Transcript of New York State Senate Session, at 31 (June 24, 2011)
[hereinafter 6/24/11 Senate Transcript], available at http://open.nysenate.gov/
legislation/transcript/regular-session-06-24-201 1.
9 Danny Hakim, Exemptions Were Key to Vote on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/26/nyregion/religious-exemptionswere-key-to-new-york-gay-marriage-vote.html.
90
91
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The Text of the MarriageEquality Act

The MEA provides for the right of same-sex couples to marry
in the state of New York." In its statement of intent, the Act
recognizes that "[miarriage is a fundamental human right," and
"[s]ame-sex couples should have the same access as others to the
protections, responsibilities, rights, obligations, and benefits of
civil marriage."" To achieve these goals, the MEA creates a new
section, section 10-a, under the DRL. The first part of the
section, section 10-a(1), provides that a marriage shall be valid
regardless of the sex of the parties.9 8 The second part, section 10a(2), prohibits discrimination based on the sexes of the parties in
the marriage. 99
At the same time that section 10-a grants these rights to
same-sex couples, DRL section 10-b carves out two religious
exceptions.xoo
The first exception is aimed at the actual
solemnization and celebration of the marriage itself. DRL
section 10-b(1) provides that "religious entit[ies]" or corporations
formed under the benevolent orders law, and their employees are
not "required to provide services, accommodations, advantages,
facilities, goods, or privileges for the solemnization or celebration

6 Marriage Equality Act, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws A. 8354 (McKinney) (codified at
DOM. REL. § 10-a). Prior to the passing of the MEA, the New York Domestic
Relations Law limited marriage to opposite-sex couples. See Hernandez v. Robles, 7
N.Y.3d 338, 357, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5-6, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 774-75 (2006). Additionally,
the New York Court of Appeals held that the "New York Constitution does not
compel recognition of marriages between members of the same sex." Id. at 356, 855
N.E.2d at 5, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 774.
9 Marriage Equality Act § 2.
§2. Legislative Intent. Marriage is a fundamental human right. Same-sex
couples should have the same access as others to the protections,
responsibilities, rights, obligations, and benefits of civil marriage. Stable
family relationships help build a stronger society. For the welfare of the
community and in fairness to all New Yorkers, this act formally recognizes
otherwise-valid marriages without regard to whether the parties are of the
same or different sex.
It is the intent of the legislature that the marriages of same-sex and
different-sex couples be treated equally in all respects under the law.
Id.
* Id. § 3.
9 Id. In addition to creating the right for same-sex couples to marry and
prohibiting discrimination, the Act provides that in implementing spousal rights and
responsibilities, all statutory gender-specific language shall be construed in genderneutral language. Id.
100 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws A. 8520 (McKinney) (codified at DOM. REL. § 10-b).
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of a marriage."'o
Failing to provide such services "shall not
create any civil claim or cause of action or result in any state or
local government action to penalize, withhold benefits, or
discriminate against such" religious organizations.' 0 2
The second exception, section 10-b(2) adopts the language of
EL section 296(11) and in doing so, applies to more parties as
well as more actions than the first exception. First, the exception
reaches beyond religious entities and corporations formed under
the benevolent orders law to religious organizations in general.
Second, the exception reaches beyond solemnization and
celebrations of marriages to a seemingly limitless range of
possibilities. In its entirety, the exception provides:
Notwithstanding any state, local or municipal law or rule,
regulation, ordinance, or other provision of law to the contrary,
nothing in this article shall limit or diminish the right,
pursuant to subdivision eleven of section two hundred ninetysix of the executive law, of [1] any religious or denominational
institution or organization, or any organization operated for
charitable or educational purposes, which is operated,
supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious
organization, [2] to limit employment or sales or rental of
housing accommodations or admission to or give preference to
persons of the same religion or denomination or [3] from taking
such action as is calculated by such organization to promote the
religious principles for which it is established or maintained. 03
As it did with EL section 296(11), this Note divides DRL
section 10-b(2) into three parts: The first part identifies the
organizations which qualify, the second part enumerates specific
actions and specific areas which are exempted, and the third part
identifies a broad catch-all for other actions that may be
exempted.
The religious exceptions provided in DRL section 10-b are
comparable to those of other jurisdictions which have legalized
same-sex marriage. As of September 2012, same-sex marriage is
legal in seven jurisdictions.0 o In two of these jurisdictions-Iowa
101 Id.
102

Id.

103

Id.

§ 1.

John Gibeaut, Marriage Proposal: Court May Weigh Levels of Scrutiny for
Same-Sex
Couples,
A.B.A.
J.,
Sept.
1,
2012,
available
at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/marriageproposal-court-may-weighl_
evels-ofscrutiny_forsame-sex_couples.
104
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and Massachusetts-same-sex marriage was created as the
result of court decisions.os
In the other jurisdictionsConnecticut, New Hampshire, Vermont and Washington, D.C.same-sex marriage was created by statute. Each of these
jurisdictions has included an exception, similar to DRL
section 10-b(1), which allows clergy, religious congregations, and
religious organizations to refuse to solemnize or celebrate samesex marriages.10 6
This is where the statutes' similarities end. Indeed, when it
comes to extending religious exceptions beyond solemnizing and
celebrating same-sex marriage, the jurisdictions offer varying
levels of protection to religious organizations. Connecticut has
perhaps the most restrictive exception. The statute only states
that the same-sex marriage law will not affect how religious
organizations provide adoption, foster care, or social services, but
only if the organization "does not receive state or federal funds
for that specific program or purpose."107 Another example of a
statute with a rather limited exception is the Washington, D.C.
statute, which allows religious organizations to refuse services,
accommodations, facilities, or goods, but only when "promotion of
marriage through religious programs, counseling, courses, or
retreats . . . is in violation of the religious society's beliefs."10

In

contrast to these relatively narrow exceptions, New Hampshire
and Vermont have exceptions almost identical to DRL section 10b.109
105See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep't of
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003), affd sub nom. Largess v. Supreme
Judicial Court for State of Mass., 373 F.3d 219, 229 (1st Cir. 2004). Since courts
created same-sex marriage in these jurisdictions, there are no religious exceptions in
the law. In Massachusetts, the governor and members of the legislature tried to
create a religious exception in the law, however, this attempt was unsuccessful. See

Patricia Wen, In Break From Romney, Healey Raps Gay Adoption Exclusion,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 3, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/
articles/2006/03/03/inbreakfromromneyhealey-raps-ay-adoption exclusion. As
of yet, there has not been a similar push in the Iowa legislature.
'0
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-22b, 46b-35a (West 2012); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 457:37 (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, § 4502(1) (West 2012); D.C. CODE § 46-406 (2012).
'o CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-35b.
108 D.C. CODE § 46-406(e)(1).
109 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37 (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:18
(2012)). New Hampshire's exception, like New York's, incorporates its HRL religious
exception:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to bar any religious or
denominational institution or organization, or any organization operated
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Although these jurisdictions may vary in the degree to which
they grant exceptions, they all begin from the same place: They
all state the parties to whom the exceptions apply and in what
circumstances these parties may invoke the exceptions.
Illinois-which offers civil unions as opposed to same-sex
marriages-offers an alternate scheme and is notable because it
is the only state that has faced litigation over its exception.
Perhaps relying on the adage "less is more," the Illinois
legislature, in drafting its civil union law,10 created a relatively
spartan religious exception: "Nothing in this Act shall interfere
with or regulate the religious practice of any religious body. Any
religious body . .. is free to choose whether or not to solemnize or

officiate a civil union.""' Any such reliance on this adage,
however, was misguided. Shortly after the law went into effect
in June 2011, the Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services ("DCFS") decided not to renew its contract with Catholic
Charities for foster-care placement because the organization
refused to place children with same-sex couples.112
DCFS
informed Catholic Charities that its refusal violated the antidiscrimination provision of the new civil union law."' Catholic
Charities sought an injunction against DCFS's action, arguing,
inter alia, that as a religious organization, its actions were

for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or
controlled by or in connection with a religious organization, from limiting
admission to or giving preference to persons of the same religion or
denomination or from making such selection as is calculated by such
organization to promote the religious principles for which it is established
or maintained.
Id. § 354-A:18; see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502(1) ("This subsection shall not be
construed to limit a religious organization, association, or society, or any nonprofit
institution or organization operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction
with a religious organization from selectively providing services, accommodations,
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to some individuals with respect to the
solemnization or celebration of a marriage but not to others.").
110 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 75/20 (West 2012) ("A party to a civil union is
entitled to the same legal obligations, responsibilities, protections, and benefits as
are afforded or recognized by the law of Illinois to spouses, whether they derive from
statute, administrative rule, policy, common law, or any other source of civil or
criminal law.").
n Id. 75/15.

n2 Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Springfield v. State, No. 2011-MR-254,
2011 WL 3655016, at *1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 2011).
'

Id.
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exempt from the law. 114 In August, an Illinois Circuit Court
judge found that Catholic Charities had no legally recognizable
property interest in government contracts and granted summary
judgment in favor of DCFS."15 Three months later, Catholic
Charities ceased its appeals and started transferring more than
one thousand children to other foster agencies. 16
B.

The Legislative History of the MarriageEqualityAct

The legislative history of the MEA shows that the New York
legislature, particularly the Senate, intended to give religious
organizations broad exemptions from the statute's antidiscrimination provisions. There is a tension in the MEA, similar
to that in the HRL, between preventing discrimination against
same-sex couples and protecting the rights of religious
organizations to stand against something contrary to their
religious beliefs. This tension animated much of the MEA's
history, especially its evolution from an Assembly bill to a Senate
bill. In their debates, as well as in explaining their votes,
Assembly members and Senators repeatedly acknowledged that
religious organizations would not be required to recognize samesex marriages nor be subjected to civil claims or government
recrimination for refusing to do so. The strengthened religious
exceptions and the inseverability clause, which were integral to
the Senate passing the bill, reflect these values. Both the floor
debate and the additions to the bill show that the Legislature
balanced competing interests, and in the end, favored religious
freedom over non-discrimination.
The floor debate in the Assembly on the original draft of the
bill often mentioned the protection that would be provided to
religious organizations.
The original version of the MEA,
Assembly Bill 8354,117 was passed on June 15, 2011, by a vote of

114 Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint at 7-8, 10-11, Catholic
Charities of the Diocese of Springfield, 2011 WL 3655016 (No. 2011-MR-254).
115 Catholic Charitiesof the Diocese of Springfield, 2011 WL 3655016, at *1.
116 Manya A. Brachear, 3 Dioceses Drop Foster Care Lawsuit, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-11-15/news/ct-met-catholic15,
2011,
charities-foster-care-20111115_1_civil-unions-act-catholic-charities-religiousfreedom-protection.
1 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws. A 8354 (McKinney).
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eighty to sixty-three.1 18 In presenting the bill, Assembly Member
Daniel O'Donnell noted that it was similar to same-sex marriage
bills passed by the Assembly in 2007 and 2009, but that this bill
added language from EL section 296(11), which he described as a
"carveout[]" that "exempt[s] certain entities and organizations
from being required to be compliant with the Human Rights
Law.""'s That the Assembly believed these exceptions would
protect the religious organizations is well supported in the
record. In arguing for the bill, Assembly Member Janet Duprey
noted that the "legislation will not force any religion
to . .. recognize same-sex marriages in any way." 12 0 In a similar
vein, Assembly Member Harry Bronson noted that the law "will
not interfere with your religious beliefs, and I would not try to
convince anybody to change their religious beliefs, being a
religious person myself"12 '
In fact, at least one member
suggested that requiring religious groups to recognize same-sex
marriages would violate both the state and federal
constitutions.1 2 2 Yet another member stated one of the reasons
he was voting for the bill was the fact that "no religion will be
forced to do anything" different after the bill becomes law.123
us Dan Wiessner, New York Assembly Backs Gay Marriage, Senate Showdown
Next, REUTERS (June 15, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/16/usnewyork-gaymarriage-idUSTRE75FOBT20110616.
119 6/15/11 Assembly Transcript, supra note 93, at 82.
120 Id. at 100.
121 Id. at 122.
122 Assembly Member Kevin Cahill
stated:
Our Federal Constitution says that we may not establish religions, we may
not prohibit religions or the free exercise thereof, and this legislation today
respects religion, it does not establish religion. It does not prevent the free
exercise of religion. Our own New York State Constitution says that we
must continue forever to allow for the free exercise and enjoyment of the
religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference for
all people, for all mankind, all humankind. We are respecting the United
States Constitution today, we are respecting the New York State
Constitution today and we are respecting religion today.
Id. at 140. Additionally,
[cihanging the definition of civil marriage in the State of New York no more
defines the religious institution of marriage than the statute as it exists
today defines the religious institution of marriage. It does not, ladies and
gentlemen. We, in this Body, of all people, are specifically prohibited from
doing that. The law as it exists doesn't do that. The law as we will change it
cannot do that and will not do that.
Id. at 142 (statement of Assemb. Kevin Cahill).
1
Id. at 176-77 ("When everybody wakes up in the next couple of days and this
is signed by the Governor into law, no religion will be forced to do anything. Nobody
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For the Senate, the religious exceptions in Assembly Bill
8354 were not sufficient. Before the Senate voted on the bill,
Senators amended the bill to add additional exceptions and an
inseverability clause. 24
The purpose of this amendment,
according to one of its chief drafters, Senator Stephen Saland,
was

to

"to assure

that

organized

religions, . . . benevolent

associations[,] and not-for-profit associations or corporations
affiliated with or controlled by religious corporations would not
be subject not merely to civil actions but also to government
actions."' 25 To this end, the amendment revised the language of
DRL section 10-b(1) to protect a greater variety of religious
organizations 2 6 and activities, 2 7 as well as to prevent
government retribution against organizations that exercise their
rights under the exception.' 8
The Senate amendment also revised the language of DRL
section 10-b(2). Most importantly, the revision provided that the
exception adopted from EL section 296(11) would have force,
"[niotwithstanding any state, local or municipal law or rule,
regulation, ordinance, or other provision of law to the
contrary." 2 9
This language was added to avoid any
"encroachment" on this exception by other municipal, county, or
state laws. 30 In addition to the revisions to DRL sections 10-b(1)
will be forced to believe a different way. Only a certain segment of people will be able
to have those relationships respected the same way by their State that everybody
else's is. For that reason, Mr. Speaker, I will be voting in the affirmative.")
(statement of Assemb. Kenneth Zebrowski).
124 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws A. 8520 (McKinney).
125 6/24/11 Senate Transcript, supra note 94.
126 See 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws A. 8520. Not only are "religious
entit[ies]" and
"corporation[s] incorporated under the benevolent orders law," included under the
exception but also "not-for-profit corporation[s]" which are "operated, supervised, or
controlled by a religious corporation," as well employees of any of those
organizations. Id.
17 Id. In addition to "accommodations, advantages, facilities ... or privileges,"
the amendments added "goods" and "services" to the list of what these organizations
would not be required to provide "for the solemnization or celebration of a marriage."
Id.
128 Id. ("Any such refusal to provide services,
accommodations, advantages,
facilities, goods, or privileges shall not .. . result in any state or local government
action to penalize, withhold benefits, or discriminate against such religious
[organizations].").
129 Id.
1 6/24/11 Senate Transcript, supra note 94, at 31-32. Senator Saland
explained that "the reason that language has been added is to make sure that there
are no encroachments on Section 296(11) of the Executive Law .

. .

. [T]he concern
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and (2), the amendment also added an inseverability clause. 81
As to this inseverability clause, Senator Saland remarked that it
was "very, very critically important," and noted "for the third
time, [the MEA is] required to be treated as a whole and all parts
are to be read and construed together."'3 2
The addition of this amendment was integral to the bill
passing the Senate. Prior to the amendment being introduced on
June 24, 2011, the outcome of the vote was still unclear. The bill
needed thirty-two votes to pass. Only thirty-one senators had
voiced their support for the bill.13 3 When the vote was called, two
additional Republicans crossed party lines and voted for the
bill.134 Both of these Senators stated that the religious exceptions
were critical to their votes. Senator Saland, a drafter of the
amendment, issued a press release stating: "For me to support
marriage equality, however, it was imperative that the
legislation contain all the necessary religious exemptions, so as
not to interfere with religious beliefs which I hold as important
as equal rights. I believe this legislation satisfactorily resolves
the religious exemptions."' 5 The second Senator to cross the
aisle, Mark Grisanti, explained his vote in similar terms, noting
that as a Catholic and a lawyer, he felt confident that the
exceptions protected "the religious aspects and beliefs" of

being that there might be encroachments in some other state statute or, every bit as
importantly if not more so, by some local action by a county, a city, or any other
municipality." Id.
"' 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws A. 8520. The inseverability clause in its entirety reads:
This act is to be construed as a whole, and all parts of it are to be read and
construed together. If any part of this act shall be adjudged by any court of
competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the remainder of this act shall be
invalidated. Nothing herein shall be construed to affect the parties' right to
appeal the matter.
Id.
132 6/24/11 Senate Transcript, supra note 94.
"I Nicholas Confessore & Danny Hakim, Same-Sex Marriage Within One Vote
of Passage in Albany, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM (June 14, 2011, 4:42 PM),
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/same-sex-marriage-within-one-vote-ofpassage-in-albany.
134 Confessore & Barbaro, supranote 18.
135 Stephen M. Saland, Senator Saland's Statement on Marriage Equality, NEW
YORK STATE SENATE
(June 25, 2011),
http://www.nysenate.gov/pressrelease/senator-salands-statement-marriage-equality.

2012]

THE NEW YORK MARRIAGE EQUALITYACT

229

churches and religious organizations.13 6
The amendment's
importance is also demonstrated by the fact that the amendment
was voted on before the bill-in-chief. 3 7
The legislative history of the MEA shows that the legislators
carefully balanced the competing interests of non-discrimination
and religious freedom. However, in the end, the balance weighed
more heavily in favor of religious freedom. Numerous legislators
promised that the law would protect the freedom of religious
organizations not to recognize same-sex marriage. Fearing the
existing exceptions insufficient, the Senate added additional
exceptions covering more organizations and more actions. The
deciding votes were cast by senators only after those senators
were assured that the exceptions provided sufficient protection
for religious organizations.
And finally, in adding the
inseverability clause, the legislature signaled that it was willing
to sacrifice marriage equality altogether if a court ruled the
religious exceptions unconstitutional.
III. APPLYING DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW SECTION 10-B(2)
To DISCRIMINATION BY CATHOLIC CHARITIES IN
FOSTER PLACEMENT SERVICES

The anti-discrimination provisions of the MEA will not
infringe on the right of Catholic Charities to refuse to place foster
children in the homes of same-sex couples. Such action falls
within the plain meaning of the Act's religious exceptions
because Catholic Charities is a religious organization and this
action is "calculated . . . to promote the religious principles for

which it is established or maintained."'*3 One may argue a plain
reading of the text renders parts of the law redundant or
inconsistent. However, a look at the Act's legislative history, as
well as judicial interpretations of identical language in the HRL,
resolves any redundancy or inconsistency that one may find.
13 6/24/11 Senate Transcript, supra note 94, at 39 ("[T]here's another important
point here that this bill brings up, and that's its religious protections. Because I am
Catholic. Under this bill the religious aspects and beliefs are protected, as well as for
not-for-profits. There's no mandate that the Catholic Church or any other religious
organization perform ceremonies or rent halls. There cannot be a civil claim or an
action against a church. It protects benevolent organizations such as the Knights of
Columbus and many others. And as a lawyer, I feel confident that the religious
organizations and the others are protected.").

"' See id.
13 N.Y. EXEC. LAW

§ 296(11) (McKinney 2012).
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Furthermore, public policy demands a broad interpretation of the
exception to protect not only religious freedom but also to keep
one of the State's largest private social welfare providers in
business.
A.

The Plain Text of the Statute Exempts Catholic Charities
from the MEA's Anti-DiscriminationProvision
A purely textual interpretation of the MEA's religious
exceptions is sufficient to exempt Catholic Charities' decision to
not place children with same-sex couples. It is a well-established
canon of statutory interpretation that when the language of a
statute is unambiguous, that language should be given its plain
meaning.'3 9
The MEA's language is unambiguous.
DRL
section 10-a(2) prohibits same-sex marriages from being denied
any "right, benefit, [or] privilege" accorded traditional
marriages.' 4 0 An exception to this general anti-discrimination
provision is provided at DRL section 10-b(2).
First, this
exception identifies that the type of actor exempted is "any
religious . .. organization."' 4 ' Second, the exception, in particular
the catch-all in section 10-b(2) identifies the kind, as well as
under what circumstances, the action is exempted: when "taking
such action [ ] is calculated by such organization to promote the
religious principles for which it is established or maintained."14 2
Therefore, since the statutory language is unambiguous, it
should be interpreted according to its plain meaning.
Catholic Charities' refusal to place foster children with
same-sex couples, in accordance with its religious beliefs, falls
within the plain meaning of the exception. First, Catholic
Although a precise
Charities is a religious organization.
definition of "religious organization" may be elusive, Catholic
Catholic
Charities certainly falls within that definition.
Charities touts its humble beginning in post-Civil War New
York, when it was comprised of a number of both Catholic
religious societies and lay groups serving poor Catholic

s' See Buchbinder Tunick & Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of N.Y., 100 N.Y.2d
389, 393, 795 N.E.2d 616, 618, 764 N.Y.S.2d 61, 63 (2003).
140 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a(2) (McKinney 2012).
14 Id.
§ 10-b(2).
142 Id.
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immigrants.'" Even though the organization has since then
expanded to serve all people regardless of religion, it still works
in close concert with the leadership of the Archdiocese of New
York,'" and it follows a decidedly Catholic mission.'" Second, by
placing foster children only with couples in a traditional
marriage rather than with those in a same-sex marriage,
Catholic Charities is promoting a religious principle for which it
was established. According to its vision statement, "[b] elieving in
the presence of God in our midst, [Catholic Charities] proclaim[s]
the sanctity of human life and the dignity of the person by
sharing in the mission of Jesus given to the Church."'"4
According to Catholic tradition, "the sanctity of human life and
the dignity of the person" is expressed through the natural law. 4 7
Under this same tradition, "homosexual acts are intrinsically
disordered" and "contrary to the natural law."4 s Placing children
with couples in traditional marriages and refusing to recognize
same-sex marriages therefore proclaims the dignity of the human
person, and promotes a religious principle for which Catholic
Charities was established. As such, this situation falls within
the statutory exception.
Despite this plausible plain reading of the statue, it is
possible to raise two textual arguments against such a reading.
The first is an objection based on the presumption against
redundancy.
According to this interpretative canon, one
statutory provision should not be read in a way that renders
another provision superfluous or unnecessary. 49 In support of
this argument, one need only look at the two exceptions in the
MEA. The first, narrow exception (DRL section 10-b(1)) applies
'

YORK,

See The Early Years, CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF THE ARCHDIOCESE OF NEW
http/www.catholiccharitiesny.org/about-us/history/the-early-years
(last

visited Aug. 15, 2013).

I See Timothy Michael Cardinal Dolan, A Letter From His Eminence, Timothy
Michael CardinalDolan, CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF THE ARCHDIOCESE OF NEW YORK,
http//www.catholiccharitiesny.org/about-us/leadership/a-letter-from-timothymichael-cardinal-dolan (last visited Aug. 15, 2013).
145 Our
Vision
and
Mission,
CATHOLIC
CHARITIES
USA,
http://www.catholiccharitiesusa.org/page.aspx?pid=1407 (last visited Feb. 11, 2012)
("To this end, Catholic Charities works with individuals, families and communities
to help them meet their needs, address their issues, eliminate oppression, and build
a just and compassionate society.").
1

Id.

See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 10, 1956.
us Id. 2357 (internal quotation marks omitted).
149 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113 (2001).
147
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only to "religious entit[ies]" in the context of "soleminiz[ing] or
The second exception-DRL
celebrat[ing]" marriages."'o
section 10-b(2)-in particular the catch-all, applies to any
"religious . . . institution
or
organization"
in
any
"action . .. calculated. . . to promote the [organization's] religious
principles."'
If the statute is read according to its plain
meaning, the second exception appears to swallow the first. All
"religious entit[ies]" are presumably "religious organization [s]"
and refusing to "solemniz[e]" or "celebrat[e]" a wedding is
presumably an action calculated to "promote the religious
principles" for which the organization is established.1 52
Accordingly, both exceptions cannot be read according to their
plain meaning because doing so would make the narrow
exception superfluous and contradict the intent of the legislature.
The second argument is based on a presumption of statutory
consistency. According to this canon, a statutory provision
should not be read in a way that is inconsistent with another
provision.'
The catch-all of DRL section 10-b(2) does not exist
by itself. It is preceded by specific discriminatory actions, which
a religious organization can lawfully carry out when it acts on
the basis of a person's religion.154 An argument could be made
that the catch-all should be read in a consistent way, namely that
it should only apply when the religious organization
discriminates on the basis of another's religion. Interpreting the
catch-all to apply to discrimination based on another's sexual
orientation, distinct from a person's religion,"' is inconsistent
with what the legislature intended in drafting the statute.
Under this interpretation, Catholic Charities' refusal to place
foster children with a non-Catholic couple would be exempted
because it would be acting on the basis of the couple's religion;
however, its refusal to place foster children with same-sex
couples would not be exempted because it would be acting on the
basis of the couple's sexual orientation.

See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
I' See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687, 722-23 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
15o

151
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These arguments, whatever validity they may have, are
directly contradicted by the legislative history of the MEA and
the judicial interpretations of the HRL's identical religious
exception.
B.

The MEA's Legislative History Shows the Legislature'sIntent
To Exempt Catholic Charitiesfrom the Statute's AntiDiscriminationProvision
The legislative history of the MEA, especially the history of
its religious exceptions, shows that the legislature intended DRL
section 10-b(2) to exempt Catholic Charities' decision not to place
foster children with same-sex couples. Protection of religion and
religious organizations was a primary concern of the legislature.
In both Assembly debate on the original bill and Senate debate
on the amendments, legislators repeatedly expressed the desire
and expectation that the MEA would not force religions or
religious organizations to accept same-sex marriages. 5 6 During
the Assembly debate, Assembly Member O'Donnell, the primary
sponsor of the bill,'5 in response to a question posed by another
Assembly member, announced that the bill would "[albsolutely
not" compel any religious person to solemnize a same-sex
marriage.' 8 Another Assembly member noted that doing so
might violate the federal and state constitution.'5 ' In the Senate,
the two Senators who cast the deciding votes in favor of the bill
expressed the importance of their own religious beliefs and
certainty that the bill would not infringe on the ability of
religious organizations to carry out their missions.6 o
Indeed, one might even argue that, in balancing the
competing interests of marriage equality and religious freedom,
the legislature intended religious freedom to occupy the favored
position. This was certainly true in the Senate where the two
deciding senators did not agree to vote for the bill-in-chief until
after a more robust amendment was adopted.' 6 ' Additionally,
beyond strengthening the exceptions for religious groups, the
Senate amendment included an inseverability clause to the
'-

See supra Part II.B.

157 N.Y. Assemb. B. Summary, 2011 A.B. 8354,

Leg. (N.Y. 2011).
23 4
6/15/11 Assembly Transcript, supra note 93, at 90.
159 See discussion supra note 122.
160 See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
1 See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
158
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bill.'6 2 This "very, very critically important"63 addition not only
guaranteed that the whole law would be struck down if any part
of it was found unconstitutional, but showed that the legislature
was willing to sacrifice the whole bill if the religious exceptions
were subsequently eliminated.
This strong legislative support for religious exception is
inconsistent with the first textual objection that a broad reading
of the catch-all makes the narrow exception redundant. The
intent of the legislature is clear: Whenever there is a conflict
between the religious exceptions and any other law, or the
exceptions and civil claims, the conflict is to be "resolved in favor
of the religious exception."'" If the exceptions appear to be
redundant, it is only because the legislature intended to
vigorously protect religious freedom. The resulting language is
not a result of an intention to limit religious protections, but a
result of over-legislating. Read in light of the legislative history,
the reason the second exception appears to swallow the first
exception is not because the legislature intended the second
exception to be narrowly read, but because the legislature
wanted to protect religious freedom against all eventualities.
New York Judicial Interpretationof the Human Rights Law
Suggests the MEA Exempts Catholic Charitiesfrom the
Statute'sAnti-DiscriminationProvision
New York precedent suggests that Catholic Charities'
decision not to place foster children with same-sex couples falls
within the exception granted at DRL section 10-b(2). When faced
with an identical exception under the HRL, the Court of Appeals
in Scheiber found that the exception applied only in instances
where there was an actual connection between the
discriminatory action and the organization's religious mission. 6 5
Unlike the university in Scheiber, Catholic Charities would
present not merely a hypothetical question but rather an
"undisputed factual predicate" that same-sex marriage is one of
the hot-button social issues on which the Church has taken a
"strong religious position," and that in refusing to place children
with same-sex couples, Catholic Charities would be taking an
C.

See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
163 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
164 6/24/11 Senate Transcript, supra note 94.
16 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
162
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action that is calculated to effectuate its religious mission.'6 6
Because of this tight fit between action and religious mission,
there is little danger-as the court feared the university was
doing in Scheiber-of Catholic Charities discriminating "for
reasons having nothing to do with the free exercise of religion
and then invok[ing] the exemption as a shield against its

unlawful conduct."16 7
New York precedent also refutes the second textual objection
that a presumption of consistency requires DRL section 10-b(2)
be read to protect religious organizations only when they
discriminate on the basis of another's religion. In Lown and
Logan, the only New York cases dealing directly with sexual
orientation, the courts did not hesitate in applying identical
language to discrimination based on another's sexual orientation,
rather then his or her religion.168 In these decisions, the courts
implicitly accepted that the Salvation Army may limit
employment of homosexuals under the catch-all exception of EL
section 296(11).161 While the cases ultimately had different
outcomes,'170 both courts used the catch-all language as a starting
point to analyze this particular discrimination. While the courts
did not explain their reasons for treating these two types of
discrimination the same, they likely focused on the Salvation
Army's argument that in denying employment to homosexuals, it
was promoting its religious principles. The motivation for the
discrimination-in other words, the Salvation Army's desire to
promote its religious belief that homosexuality is wrong-was

166 Scheiber v. St. John's University, 84 N.Y.2d 120, 124-25, 127-28, 638 N.E.2d
977, 979-80, 615 N.Y.S.2d 332, 334-35 (1994).
16
Id. at 126-27, 638 N.E.2d at 980, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
* See Lown v. Salvation Army, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 223, 252-53 (S.D.N.Y.
2005); Logan v. Salvation Army, 10 Misc. 3d 756, 758-59, 809 N.Y.S.2d 846, 848-49
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2005).
169 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
170 While the Supreme Court in Logan ultimately denied the
Salvation Army's
motion to dismiss, the decision was not due to sexual orientation discrimination not
being covered in the "catch-all" language, but rather was due to the particular
"harass[ment]," and "derogatory expressions," especially in the "odiously
discriminatory manner" they were conducted, being beyond the scope of the
exception. Logan, 10 Misc. 3d at 758-59, 809 N.Y.S.2d at 848-49. In this way, the
court seems to have found that the specific discrimination of the case, not
discrimination in general, was not covered as a matter of law.
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more important than the nuanced distinction between
discriminating on the basis of another's religion and
discriminating on the basis of another's sexual orientation.
The courts may also be more likely to ignore this distinction
in this situation because of the very public nature of a marriage.
In Lown, the Salvation Army was allowed to discriminate against
homosexuals in hiring, even though sexual preference can be a
very private phenomenon. The Salvation Army, as well as the
public in general, may never know that an employee is
homosexual. In such a situation, the organization can continue
to effectuate its religious mission with integrity. However, in the
case of same-sex marriage, where there are public records of the
marriage and other outside displays of the marriage-such as
wedding bands, shared last names, and shared insuranceproviding foster placement services to couples in a same-sex
Indeed, Catholic
marriage may appear as tacit approval.
Charities would be unable to proclaim its conception of human
dignity without appearing hypocritical. Of course, none of these
considerations would excuse Catholic Charities from acting
towards same-sex couples in an odiously discriminatory manner.
As the court noted in Logan, it is a "far cry" from simply limiting
employment of homosexuals to harassing and using derogatory
language toward homosexual employees.
D. Public Policy Favors that Catholic CharitiesBe Exempted
from the MEA's Anti-DiscriminationProvision
In addition to these arguments from textual interpretation,
legislative history, and case law, public policy also supports
finding Catholic Charities' decision not to place children with
same-sex couples within the exception. As noted previously, the
foster care system in New York deals with one of the most
vulnerable populations in the state. Children enter this system
because their families cannot care for them. The cause of this
may be the death of the child's parents or a court determination
of abuse and neglect.171 In New York City, there are currently
over 16,000 such children in foster care.172 Catholic Charities is
at the forefront of placing these children in safe foster homes.
For example, Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of New
In Protectingand NurturingChildren and Youth,
172

supra note 6.
Become a Foster or Adoptive Parent,supra note 7.
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York-which covers the New York City boroughs of Manhattan,
The Bronx and Staten Island, as well as Dutchess, Orange,
Putnam, Rockland, Sullivan, Ulster, and Westchester countiesplaced 6,545 children in foster care in 2010.173 Utilizing a
national network and volunteers, as well as the infrastructure of
the Church, Catholic Charities is able to provide these services
extremely efficiently. Catholic Charities spends about eightyeight cents of every dollar directly for program expenses.174 If the
exception did not cover Catholic Charities in the State of New
York, it would likely leave the foster care placement business, as
it did in Massachusetts, Illinois and Washington, D.C. The
segment of society forced to bear the brunt of this outcome would
be the segment least capable of bearing it: New York's foster
children.
CONCLUSION

Although the religious exception in the MEA protects
Catholic Charities decision not to place foster children with
same-sex couples, the ability of religious organizations to freely
practice their religious beliefs is by no means safe. This Note has
been largely concerned with a hypothetical legal challenge
against a religious organization by a same-sex couple that had
been denied services. The text of the religious exception as well
as its legislative history suggest that this is the kind of challenge
that the legislature had in mind. However, there are other
challenges, at both the state and federal level, that threaten the
ability of Catholic Charities and other religious organizations to
freely practice their beliefs.
One such challenge could come from the State of New York if
it refused to renew a social services contract with Catholic
Charities. Similar to what happened in Illinois,
the State
could decide to give more weight to non-discrimination than
religious freedom. In granting summary judgment for the State,
the Illinois trial court found that under state law, Catholic
Charities did not have a legally recognized property interest in

173

174

2010:

Protectingand NurturingChildren and Youth, supra note 6.

CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF THE ARCHDIOCESE OF NEW YORK, ANNUAL REPORT
PROVIDING
HELP
CREATING
HOPE
33
(2011),
available at

http://www.catholiccharitiesny.org/media/files/CCAnnualReport2010.pdf.
171 See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
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However, the language of DRL
government contracts.'7
section 10-b might prevent such a decision in New York. The
religious exception appears to prevent New York from doing
exactly what Illinois did, namely retaliating against a religious
organization that refuses to provide services to same-sex couples.
The statute provides: "Any such refusal to provide services,
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges shall
not . .. result in any state or local government action to penalize,

withhold benefits, or discriminate against such ... a not-forprofit corporation operated .. . by a religious corporation." 7 7
However, the outcome is not certain. This language comes from
DRL section 10-b(1), which as noted previously, deals with
solemnizing and celebrating marriages as applied to religious
entities and corporations formed under the benevolent orders
law.7 Whether a court would extend this provision to cover a
religious organization like Catholic Charities that refused to
place foster children with same-sex couples is still unknown,
although the legislative history, especially the statements of
Senator Saland, support its application.179
Another possible challenge comes not from the State, but
from federal legislation. On October 28, 2011, US Senator
Kirsten Gillibrand of New York introduced a bill entitled: "Every
Child Deserves a Family Act.""8 o This bill was also introduced in
the House of Representatives8 1 and had eighty-one cosponsors. 18 2 The legislation is intended to end discrimination
against adoptive and foster parents based on sexual orientation
and marital status. 18 3 To that end, the bill would prohibit an
organization that receives federal funding or contracts with an
entity that receives federal funding from "deny[ing] to any person
the opportunity to become an adoptive or a foster parent on the
176 See Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Springfield v. State, No. 2011-MR254, 2011 WL 3655016, at *1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 2011).
"7 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-b(1) (McKinney 2012).
178 See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
179 See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
1so See Press Release, Kirsten Gillibrand, Gillibrand Introduces Every Child
Deserves a Family Act (Oct. 28, 2011), available at http://gillibrand.senate.gov/
newsroom/press/release/gillibrand-introduces-every-child-deserves-a-family-act.
181Every Child Deserves a Family Act, H.R. 1681, 112th Cong. (2011).
182 Martin Gill, Every Child Deserves a Family, THE HILL'S CONGRESS BLOG
(Nov. 22, 2011, 10:23 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/civil-rights/195059every-child-deserves-a-family.
'3 See Press Release, Kirsten Gillibrand, supra note 180.
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basis of the sexual orientation .. . or marital status of the
person." 84
The bill provides no exception for religious
organizations. As it now stands, if this bill passes, it could
preempt the MEA's religious exception in regards to foster care
placement. In such an event, Catholic Charities and other
religious organizations across the nation would have to choose
between following the dictates of the faith and providing foster
care services.
The goal of actions such as those undertaken by Illinois and
the supporters of Every Child Deserves a Family Act is an
important one. Non-discrimination, especially regarding nontraditional families, is integral to a healthy, functioning society.
However, non-discrimination, without protection for the
fundamental right of religious freedom, only weakens society. In
the case of Catholic Charities, this weakening would result from
the loss of diverse beliefs as well as the loss of an important
welfare provider. It would truly be a shame if after a century
and half of dedication, Catholic Charities was forced to choose
between serving one of the most vulnerable groups in society and
following its religious dictates. Without a doubt, other groups
would step in and take over, as they have done in Massachusetts,
Washington, D.C. and Illinois. But the question we must ask as
a state, and more generally as a nation, is whether religious
organizations should be forced to make this choice in the first
place?

'"

Every Child Deserves a Family Act, S. 1770, 112th Cong.

§ 3(a)(1) (2011).
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